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Abstract
Background: We report a recurrent outbreak of postoperative infections with extended-spectrum β-lactamase
(ESBL)–producing E. cloacae complex in cardiac surgery patients, describe the outbreak investigation and highlight
the infection control measures.
Methods: Cases were defined as cardiac surgery patients in Ghent University Hospital who were not known
preoperatively to carry ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex and who postoperatively had a positive culture for this
multiresistant organism between May 2017 and January 2018. An epidemiological investigation, including a case-
control study, and environmental investigation were conducted to identify the source of the outbreak. Clonal
relatedness of ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex isolates collected from case patients was assessed using whole-
genome sequencing–based studies.
Results: Three separate outbreak episodes occurred over the course of 9 months. A total of 8, 4 and 6 patients met
the case definition, respectively. All but one patients developed a clinical infection with ESBL-producing E. cloacae
complex, most typically postoperative pneumonia. Overall mortality was 22% (4/18). Environmental cultures were
negative, but epidemiological investigation pointed to transesophageal echocardiography (TEE) as the outbreak
source. Of note, four TEE probes showed a similar pattern of damage, which very likely impeded adequate
disinfection. The first and second outbreak episode were caused by the same clone, whereas a different strain was
responsible for the third episode.
Conclusions: Health professionals caring for cardiac surgery patients and infection control specialists should be
aware of TEE as possible infection source. Caution must be exercised to prevent and detect damage of TEE probes.
Keywords: Outbreak, Cardiac surgery, Enterobacter cloacae complex, Extended-spectrum β-lactamase,
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Background
Members of the Enterobacter cloacae complex are part
of the commensal intestinal flora in humans and can act
as opportunistic pathogens to cause serious nosocomial
infections. These facultative anaerobic Gram-negative ba-
cilli are intrinsically resistant to ampicillin, amoxicillin,
amoxicillin–clavulanic acid, first-generation cephalospo-
rins and cefoxitin due to the production of constitutive
AmpC β-lactamase [1]. Plasmid-mediated β-lactam resist-
ance is increasingly reported in E. cloacae complex strains
worldwide. The most recent estimates in Belgian acute
care hospitals indicate that 12.4 and 1.6% of all E. cloacae
complex strains are producing extended-spectrum β-lacta-
mases (ESBLs) and carbapenemases, respectively [2].
We have been confronted with an increased incidence
of ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex infections in car-
diac surgery patients in Ghent University Hospital from
May 2017 onwards. Epidemiological investigation pointed
to transesophageal echocardiography (TEE) as the source
of the outbreak. Despite initially successful institution of
infection control measures, the outbreak recurred twice
over the course of 9 months. We report here the different
outbreak episodes and shed light on a number of critical
aspects that should be taken into account to prevent and
control similar epidemics in other hospitals.
Methods
Clinical setting
Ghent University Hospital is a 1062-bed tertiary care
hospital in East Flanders, Belgium. Approximately 1000
cardiac operations on adult and pediatric patients are
performed annually by six cardiac surgeons in two desig-
nated cardiac operating rooms. Patients are admitted
postoperatively to a 10-bed cardiac surgery intensive
care unit (CSICU), where they are treated until suffi-
ciently recovered to be transferred to a 28-bed cardiac
surgery ward. The hospital has an infection control team
composed of two physicians, three nurses and three ad-
ministrative staff members.
Case definition
Cases were defined as patients who underwent cardiac
surgery in Ghent University Hospital between May 2017
and January 2018 and who subsequently developed
colonization or infection with ESBL-producing E. cloacae
complex as demonstrated by a positive culture from any
site. Patients known preoperatively to carry ESBL-produ-
cing E. cloacae complex were excluded from the case def-
inition. Systematic preoperative screening of cardiac
surgery patients for multiresistant Gram-negative bacteria
was installed end of June 2017, implying that the pre-
operative microbiological status is not known for all cases
in the first 1.5 months of the outbreak. An outbreak
episode was defined as at least two cases linked by a tem-
poral and epidemiological chain of transmission.
Epidemiological investigation
Several outbreak meetings were held between the hos-
pital infection control team and cardiac surgeons, anes-
thesiologists, intensivists, cardiologists, operating room
nurses and intensive care nurses to identify the source of
the outbreak and to discuss and implement infection
control measures. Medical records of all cases were
reviewed to uncover common factors. The care pathway
of cardiac surgery patients was evaluated by the infection
control team, including assessment of preoperative care,
direct observation of cardiac operations and hand hygiene
practices, inspection of wound and airway care and other
care-related activities at CSICU, assessment of antibiotic
prescribing, analysis of reprocessing of equipment and
evaluation of cleaning and disinfection procedures. Special
emphasis was given to the use and disinfection of TEE
probes, as TEE examinations are typically performed in
cardiac surgery patients and as most cases presented with
ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex in respiratory sam-
ples. Preoperative screening of rectal and throat swabs
and weekly postoperative screening of rectal swabs for
multiresistant Gram-negative bacteria were carried out in
all cardiac surgery patients after recognition of the out-
break at the end of June 2017.
Baseline incidence, attack rate and post-outbreak inci-
dence of ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex at CSICU
were quantified in the period from January 2017 to June
2018 by dividing the monthly number of new CSICU pa-
tients with an ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex isolate
from any site, with ‘new’ being defined as not previously
known at any ward or intensive care unit (ICU) as being
colonized or infected, by one hundredth of the monthly
number of admissions at CSICU. Similar incidence rates
per 100 admissions were calculated for the cardiac inten-
sive care unit (CICU), the medical intensive care unit
(MICU), the non-cardiac surgical intensive care unit
(SICU) and the entire hospital excluding CSICU.
A retrospective case-control study was performed on
the patients from the first outbreak episode. As the
number of cases was limited, two controls were included
per case in order to increase statistical power. The se-
lected controls were those two cardiac surgery patients
who did not show ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex
in any of their samples during the entire hospital stay
and who had their operation as close as possible to the
cardiac surgery of the case patient. The following pre-
operative, intraoperative and postoperative characteris-
tics were retrieved from the medical records and
compared between cases and controls: age, gender, body
mass index (BMI), smoking habit, medical history, pre-
operative length of stay, preoperative ICUs or wards,
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preoperative medication, preoperative American Society
of Anesthesiologists (ASA) score, type of cardiac surgery,
emergency setting of the operation, operating room, sur-
geons, anesthesiologists, surgical antibiotic prophylaxis,
sternotomy, extracorporeal circulation (ECC), duration
of surgery, duration of ECC, intraoperative TEE, postop-
erative TEE, need for revision, beds occupied at CSICU,
length of stay at CSICU, postoperative length of stay,
total length of stay and outcome.
Environmental investigation
Environmental surveillance samples were collected by
the hospital infection control team at several time points
during the outbreak. Sampled materials included the
different TEE probes used in cardiac surgery patients,
keyboards of the ultrasound machines, protective foam
covers for the TEE probe tips, a storage case for the TEE
probe at CSICU, ultrasound transmission gel, caps of the
ultrasound gel tubes, warm water mattresses in the
operating rooms, water from extracorporeal membrane
oxygenation systems and pillows for neonates at CSICU.
Microbiological methods
Clinical samples were processed and cultured in the
microbiology laboratory using standard diagnostic proto-
cols. Rectal and throat screening swab specimens were
grown on selective chromogenic agar plates (chromID
ESBL; bioMérieux, Marcy l’Etoile, France). Environmental
surveillance samples were cultured using direct plating
and enriched broth techniques. Suspicious colonies were
identified by matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionization
time-of-flight mass spectrometry (MALDI-TOF MS) on a
Microflex LT instrument (Bruker Daltonics, Bremen,
Germany). Antibiotic susceptibility testing of E. cloacae
complex isolates was performed on an Adagio automated
system (Bio-Rad, Hercules, CA, USA) using the disk
diffusion method and interpreted according to Euro-
pean Committee on Antimicrobial Susceptibility Test-
ing (EUCAST) breakpoints. Phenotypic identification of
ESBL production was based on double disk synergy
testing using cefotaxime, ceftazidime, amoxicillin–clavula-
nic acid and piperacillin–tazobactam. A combination disk
diffusion test using cefepime and cefepime–clavulanic acid
was performed to confirm ESBL production during the
third outbreak episode.
Molecular methods
Molecular characterization of ESBL-producing E. cloacae
complex isolates was performed by whole-genome sequen-
cing. Genomic DNA was extracted from the available
outbreak isolates and from three unrelated ESBL-producing
E. cloacae complex isolates that had been cultured from
rectal screening swabs of non-cardiac surgery patients
hospitalized at the wards of geriatry, abdominal surgery and
pneumology in October and November 2017. DNA
libraries were prepared using the Nextera XT DNA
Library Preparation Kit (Illumina, San Diego, CA, USA)
and sequenced as 300-bp paired-end reads on a MiSeq
system (Illumina). Sequencing reads were assembled using
CLC Genomics Workbench version 11.0 (Qiagen, Hilden,
Germany). Assembled contigs were uploaded to ResFinder
version 3.0 to detect the presence of acquired antimicro-
bial resistance genes [3, 4]. Multilocus sequence typing
(MLST) of the isolates was performed by submitting the
contigs to the MLST version 1.8 web service [5, 6].
Statistical analysis
Data of the case-control study were processed and ana-
lyzed using SPSS Statistics version 25 (IBM, Armonk,
NY, USA). Differences in the distribution of categorical
variables between cases and controls were assessed by
computing odds ratios (ORs) and corresponding 95% con-
fidence intervals (CIs) and by performing Fisher’s exact
tests. A Haldane’s correction, consisting of addition of 0.5
to all four cells of the contingency table, was applied in
the OR calculation if unadjusted values resulted in division
by zero. Differences in the distribution of continuous
variables between cases and controls were analyzed by
Mann–Whitney U tests. All statistical tests were two-
sided and were considered significant at P < .05.
Results
First outbreak episode
A cluster of postoperative infections with ESBL-producing
E. cloacae complex in cardiac surgery patients was sig-
nalled to the infection control team of Ghent University
Hospital in June 2017. Analysis of the monthly incidence
rates of patients with a positive culture for ESBL-produ-
cing E. cloacae complex showed an epidemic increase at
CSICU that had started in May 2017 (Fig. 1). Eight cases
were detected between May and July 2017. Table 1 shows
the demographic and clinical characteristics of the cases,
the treatment given and the outcome of the hospital stay.
The case definition included both postoperatively colo-
nized and clinically infected cardiac surgery patients, but
all cases of the first outbreak episode had clinical signs of
infection and received treatment with piperacillin–tazo-
bactam (TZP) or meropenem (MEM). Two of these case
patients had a fatal outcome, which was not considered
directly related to the postoperative infection by the phys-
ician in charge.
The presence of ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex
in respiratory samples in all but one cases and the devel-
opment of postoperative pneumonia in most cases led
us rapidly to consider airway-related procedures as pos-
sible source of the outbreak. A major suspected culprit
was the performance of TEE examinations in cardiac
surgery patients. Typically a TEE probe is inserted through
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the oropharynx into the esophagus after anesthesia induc-
tion and placed in a retrocardiac position for the entire
duration of the operation to visualize the structure and
function of the heart. Additional TEE examinations may be
performed in the postoperative period. Samples were taken
from the TEE probes of the cardiac operating rooms and
CSICU the end of June 2017, after the first six cases had
occurred, but all cultures were negative. Inspection of the
TEE probe of operating room A, where five of these six
case patients had been operated, showed clear damage to
the silicone bead around the transducer lens and the poly-
ethylene film covering the lens (Fig. 2a). It was decided to
remove the TEE probe from service. Ten days later two
new cases occurred, again with positive respiratory
samples. Inspection of the TEE probe of CSICU, which
had been used to perform postoperative TEE examina-
tions in both patients, demonstrated a similar pattern
of damage (Fig. 2b). Analysis of the incidence rates of
ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex at other ICUs
showed a minor peak at SICU and MICU in June 2017
(two and one new patients, respectively; Fig. 1). Both
infected non-cardiac patients at SICU had positive
respiratory samples and turned out to have had a TEE
examination shortly beforehand, which was very likely
performed using the TEE probe of CSICU. This probe
was removed from service mid July 2017, after which
the first outbreak episode stopped. Figure 3 shows a
timeline of cases and key interventions performed to
control the outbreak. The entire set of infection control
measures is depicted in Additional file 1: Table S1.
A case-control study was performed to identify risk
factors and outcome characteristics associated with the
development of ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex in-
fection following cardiac surgery (Table 2). Compared
to 16 control patients, the 8 cases were more likely to
have a longer duration of surgery (median, 275min vs 197
min; P = .011) and to have traceable TEE examinations in
the postoperative period (OR = 15.40 [95% CI, 1.47–
160.97]; P = .027). These findings are consistent with the
hypothesis of intraoperative and postoperative TEE exami-
nations as source of the outbreak. Cases were more likely
than controls to have a preoperative ASA score of 5 (OR =
17.00 [95% CI, 1.59–181.36]; P = .007), an emergency oper-
ation (OR = 17.00 [95% CI, 1.59–181.36]; P = .007) and a
postoperative need for urgent revision due to a non-infec-
tious complication (OR = 25.50 [95% CI, 2.36–275.74];
P = .001). Bed position E at CSICU was more often occu-
pied by cases than controls (OR = 15.00 [95% CI, 1.29–
174.39]; P = .028). Cases also had significantly longer length
of stay at CSICU compared to controls (median, 15 days vs
3 days; P = .006), longer postoperative length of stay (me-
dian, 30 days vs 10 days; P < .001) and longer total length of
stay (median, 34 days vs 12 days; P = .001).
Second outbreak episode
Four months passed without any new cardiac surgery pa-
tient having cultures positive for ESBL-producing E. cloacae
complex. The outbreak, however, unexpectedly recurred
mid November 2017, with four new cases being identified
over the course of 1 month (Fig. 1). All cases were
symptomatic and three of them had an acute respira-
tory infection with ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex
in the postoperative period (Table 1). These three cases
were infants, whereas all patients of the first outbreak
episode were adults, and one infant did not have traceable
TEE examinations. This caused uncertainty whether these
new cases were related to the first outbreak episode and
suggested a multifactorial mode of transmission. All cases
recovered after antibiotic treatment and could be dis-
charged from the hospital.
Fig. 1 Monthly incidence rates of colonization or infection with ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex at CSICU compared to other intensive care
units and to the rest of the hospital. Monthly incidence rates are shown per 100 admissions for the period from January 2017 to June 2018.
Abbreviations: CICU cardiac intensive care unit, CSICU cardiac surgery intensive care unit, ESBL extended-spectrum β-lactamase, MICU medical
intensive care unit, SICU surgical intensive care unit, w/o without
Van Maerken et al. Antimicrobial Resistance and Infection Control           (2019) 8:152 Page 4 of 14
Table 1 Demographic characteristics, clinical features, treatment and outcome of case patients
Case
No.a
Age
(yrs)
Sex Type of surgery Need for
revisionb
Type of infection Postoperative
days to infectionc
Sample typesd Treatmente Outcomef
1 42 M LVAD implantation No Pneumonia 28 Sputum, oropharynx,
chest tube insertion
site, stool, sacral
decubitus ulcer
TZP Discharge
2 55 M Aortic dissection
repair
Yes Pneumonia 2 (1) Endotracheal
aspirate, sputum,
oropharynx, stool
TZP, MEM Discharge
3 75 F Aortic valve
replacement
Yes Pneumonia 2 (2) Sputum,
endotracheal
aspirate, stool
MEM Discharge
4 53 M LVAD implantation,
tricuspid annuloplasty
Yes
(twice)
CRBSI 12 (7; 6) Blood, CVC tip,
oropharynx, stool
TZP, MEM, CVC
removal
Death
5 80 M CABG No Sternal wound
infection,
mediastinitis
5 Sternal wound
fluid, sternal
and mediastinal
debridement
samples
MEM, sternal
and mediastinal
debridement
Dischargeg
6 72 F Mitral valve
replacement,
tricuspid
annuloplasty,
maze procedure,
PFO closure,
LAA exclusion
No Pneumonia 3 Endotracheal
aspirate,
oropharynx,
BAL fluid, stool
TZP Discharge
7 78 F CABG, aortic valve
replacement
No Pneumonia, CRBSI 3 Endotracheal
aspirate, blood,
CVC tip, AC
insertion site,
stool
TZP, MEM, CVC
removal
Death
8 86 F Aortic dissection
repair
Yes Pneumonia 2 (1) Oropharynx,
sputum, stool
MEM Discharge
9 <.1 F Aortic coarctation
repair, pulmonary
artery banding
Yes Tracheo-
bronchitis
14 (14) Oropharynx,
endotracheal
aspirate
TZP Discharge
10 .3 M ASD closure, mitral
valvuloplasty
No Pneumonia 4 Oropharynx,
endotracheal
aspirate, stool,
urine
TZP Discharge
11 33 M Heart transplantation No Inguinal wound
infectionh
41 Stool, inguinal
wound fluid
Local wound
care
Discharge
12 <.1 M Blalock-Taussig
shunt placement
No Pneumonia 7 Oropharynx TZP, MEM Discharge
13 83 F Mitral valve
replacement
Yes Pneumonia,
sepsis
2 (1) Oropharynx,
endotracheal
aspirate, blood,
stool
MEM Death
14 60 M CABG, mitral
annuloplasty
No Colonizationi – Oropharynx,
endotracheal
aspirate
– Death
15 46 F Bilateral pulmonary
embolectomy
Yes Pneumonia, UTI 3 (2) Oropharynx,
endotracheal
aspirate, stool,
urine
TZP, MEM,
nitrofurantoinj
Discharge
16 62 F Aortic valve
replacement
No Infectious
exacerbation
2 Sputum, stool MEM Discharge
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Third outbreak episode
A new cluster of six cases occurred in January 2018 (Fig. 1).
All cases were adults, had undergone TEE examinations
and had respiratory samples positive for ESBL-produ-
cing E. cloacae complex (Table 1). One case died from
a non-infectious cause on the third postoperative day
and probably did not have the time to develop pneu-
monia. The other five cases developed clinical infec-
tions and were treated with antibiotics. One patient
died from ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex sepsis
secondary to pneumonia.
Similar to the first outbreak episode, there was a minor
increase in the incidence rate of ESBL-producing E. clo-
acae complex at SICU and MICU (Fig. 1). Two non-car-
diac surgery patients could be identified who had
undergone a TEE examination on the same day at MICU
and who subsequently developed ESBL-producing E. clo-
acae complex pneumonia. One of these patients also
developed a catheter-related bloodstream infection with
ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex and died a few days
later. Inspection of the TEE probe of CICU, which had
been used in both patients, showed that a part of the sili-
cone bead around the transducer lens was torn off
(Fig. 2c). Measures taken to control the third
outbreak episode included, among others, the obligatory
use of a protective sheath to cover the TEE probe during
cardiac surgery and the decision to switch from manual
cleaning and disinfection using chlorine dioxide–gen-
erating wipes to automated reprocessing for the TEE
probes of the operating rooms and CSICU (Fig. 3,
Additional file 1: Table S1). The TEE probe of CICU
and the TEE probe of the cardiology polyclinic, which
also suffered from detachment of the silicone bead
(Fig. 2d), were finally removed from service.
Only one new patient had positive cultures for ESBL-
producing E. cloacae complex following cardiac surgery
in the period from February 2018 to June 2018 (Fig. 1).
As this was a single patient without a clear temporal or
epidemiological relationship to the cases of January
2018, we did not consider this isolated finding as a new
outbreak episode.
Microbiological and molecular studies
E. cloacae complex isolates of the first and second out-
break episode displayed a similar in vitro antibiotic resist-
ance pattern, suggestive of SHV-like ESBL production
(clavulanic acid–reversible resistance to third-generation
cephalosporins, high-level resistance to trimethoprim–
Table 1 Demographic characteristics, clinical features, treatment and outcome of case patients (Continued)
Case
No.a
Age
(yrs)
Sex Type of surgery Need for
revisionb
Type of infection Postoperative
days to infectionc
Sample typesd Treatmente Outcomef
of COPD
17 64 M Aortic valve
replacement,
mitral annuloplasty
No Pneumonia,
sepsis, sternal
wound infection
1 Oropharynx, blood,
sternal wound fluid
MEM, moxifloxacin,
local wound carek
Discharge
18 75 M Aortic valve
bioprosthesis
replacement,
ascending aorta
replacement
Yes Pneumonia 16 (16)l Oropharynx, stool MEM Discharge
Abbreviations: AC arterial catheter, ASD atrial septal defect, BAL bronchoalveolar lavage, CABG coronary artery bypass grafting, COPD chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, CRBSI catheter-related bloodstream infection, CVC central venous catheter, ESBL extended-spectrum β-lactamase, LAA left atrial appendage,
LVAD left ventricular assist device, MEM meropenem, PFO patent foramen ovale, TZP piperacillin–tazobactam, UTI urinary tract infection
aCases are numbered in chronological order of occurrence. Dashed lines separate the different outbreak episodes
bPostoperative need for urgent reoperation because of bleeding with imminent or manifest pericardial tamponade or because of severe ventricular dysfunction
cNumber of days between cardiac surgery and collection of the first clinical sample positive for ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex. In case of cardiac surgery
followed by revision operation(s), values between brackets indicate days between revision operation and infection
dAll types of clinical and screening specimens from which ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex was isolated
eWhen both TZP and MEM are listed, TZP was given first and was later replaced by MEM because of antimicrobial susceptibility testing results or treatment failure
fOutcome of the hospital stay. Deaths reflect overall mortality (see text for details on attributable mortality)
gCase #5 had to be readmitted after discharge because of relapse of the sternal and mediastinal infection. Retreatment consisted of operative interventions and a
prolonged course of high-dose MEM followed by a course of oral trimethoprim–sulfamethoxazole. Full recovery was achieved at the end of the second admission
hCase #11 developed postoperative pneumonia caused by an E. cloacae complex strain that did not produce ESBL according to double disk synergy testing. An
inguinal wound infection following percutaneous femoral vein catheterization occurred later in the postoperative period. An ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex
strain was cultured from rectal swabs and inguinal wound fluid on postoperative day 19 and day 41, respectively
iCase #14 died from low cardiac output and peripheral arterial disease on the third postoperative day, a few hours after the collection of two respiratory samples
that turned out to be positive for ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex. The available time for developing an overt infection was limited in this patient. We classify
this case as being colonized, but a beginning pneumonia cannot be excluded
jCase #15 was first treated for pneumonia. TZP was given for 4 days and then switched to MEM for 10 days. The patient developed a UTI caused by ESBL-
producing E. cloacae complex 2 weeks after MEM had been stopped, for which a course of nitrofurantoin was given
kThe pneumonia and sepsis in case #17 were treated with MEM. This intravenous therapy was switched to oral moxifloxacin after 10 days, as prolonged treatment
was needed for streptococcal endocarditis. Two superficial sternal wounds were primarily treated with local wound care, but the ESBL-producing E. cloacae
complex in these wounds may also have responded well to moxifloxacin
lCase #18 was treated postoperatively with TZP and linezolid for aortic valve bioprosthesis endocarditis. The TZP treatment may have delayed the development of
full-blown pneumonia
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sulfamethoxazole and low-level resistance to ciprofloxacin
and gentamicin). Isolates of the third outbreak episode
showed a different antibiotic resistance profile (clavulanic
acid–reversible resistance to third- and fourth-generation
cephalosporins and high-level resistance to trimetho-
prim–sulfamethoxazole, ciprofloxacin and gentamicin).
The high level of resistance to cefotaxime in the latter iso-
lates suggested the production of a CTX-M–like ESBL.
Whole-genome sequencing was performed on isolates
that had been collected from four cases of the first out-
break episode (cases 4, 6, 7 and 8), three cases of the
second outbreak episode (cases 10, 11 and 12), four
cases of the third outbreak episode (cases 14, 15, 16 and
18) and both non-cardiac surgery patients who had a
similar TEE-associated infection and disease course in
January 2018 as the case patients (PC1 and PC2). Three
apparently unrelated ESBL-producing E. cloacae com-
plex isolates, collected in October and November 2017
from non-cardiac surgery patients not involved in the
outbreak (NC1, NC2 and NC3), were included as nega-
tive controls. Alignment of the contigs of the isolate ge-
nomes to the collection of β-lactam resistance genes in
the ResFinder database [3, 4] revealed an identical
profile of β-lactam resistance genes for all isolates of
the first and second outbreak episode (blaSHV-12 with
100% identity and blaACT-15 with > 90% identity) and
another identical profile for all isolates of the third
outbreak episode and both isolates of patients PC1
and PC2 (blaCTX-M-15, blaTEM-1B and blaOXA-1 with 100%
Fig. 2 Common pattern of damage of transesophageal
echocardiography probes. All affected probes were of the same type
(X7-2t transducer; Philips, Amsterdam, The Netherlands). a TEE probe
of operating room A, beginning of July 2017. The silicone bead
around the transducer lens was peeling off and was almost
completely missing at one side (the side facing the shaft of the
probe). This defect was accompanied by the complete absence of
the protective polyethylene film that normally should cover the
transducer lens. Shredded polyethylene film fragments can be seen
along the remaining parts of the silicone seal. Orange discoloration
of some ragged polyethylene film fragments and brown-yellow
deposits in the area of the torn-off silicone bead cannot be seen on
this picture, but were observed when the TEE probe was examined
under a stereoscopic microscope (no pictures available) and were
indicative of the presence of cellular debris and organic material. b
TEE probe of CSICU, mid July 2017. A large part of the silicone bead
was missing and the polyethylene film had partially come loose and
was ruptured (top). The side view of the probe tip illustrates the
detachment and rupture of the polyethylene film (bottom left).
Yellow deposits can be seen in the area of the missing silicone bead
(bottom right). c TEE probe of CICU, end of January 2018. A section of
the silicone bead was missing. d TEE probe of the cardiology
polyclinic, February 2018. The TEE probe appeared intact at the
beginning of February 2018 (left), but a new inspection 3 weeks later
revealed that a large part of the silicone bead had suddenly come off
(right). Abbreviations: CICU cardiac intensive care unit, CSICU cardiac
surgery intensive care unit, TEE transesophageal echocardiography
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identity and blaACT-16 with > 90% identity) (Fig. 4a). In
contrast, ResFinder analysis did not detect the presence of
any of these β-lactam resistance genes in the strains iso-
lated from patients NC1, NC2 and NC3. Molecular typing
using the MLST web tool of the Center for Genomic
Epidemiology [5, 6] showed an identical sequence type for
all isolates of the first and second outbreak episode
(ST90), another common sequence type for all isolates of
the third outbreak episode and those from patients PC1
and PC2 (ST114) and three different sequence types for
the isolates derived from patients NC1, NC2 and NC3
(ST729, ST104 and ST20, respectively) (Fig. 4b). Collect-
ively, these findings strongly suggest that the first and sec-
ond outbreak episode were caused by the same strain
(SHV-12–producing E. cloacae complex ST90 clone),
whereas a different strain was at the origin of the third
outbreak episode (CTX-M-15–producing E. cloacae com-
plex ST114 clone). The presence of an identical molecular
pattern in the isolates cultured from patients PC1 and
PC2 and the isolates from the case patients of the third
outbreak episode adds further evidence to the hypothesis
of TEE as mode of transmission, as the performance of a
TEE examination was the only identifiable factor common
to these two groups of affected patients.
A total of 82 environmental surveillance samples were
collected for outbreak investigation, but none of them
showed the presence of ESBL-producing E. cloacae com-
plex. Periodic sampling of TEE probes, however, identified
a transient contamination of the TEE probe of CSICU in
February 2018. Four different pathogens were cultured
from a swab sample of the TEE probe that had been
manually disinfected: ESBL-negative E. cloacae complex,
Klebsiella oxytoca, Pseudomonas aeruginosa and Entero-
coccus faecalis (data not shown). A cardiac surgery patient
was identified who had undergone a TEE examination
with this probe 18 h before the sampling and who was
known to have positive cultures for all four microorgan-
isms, with highly similar antibiotic susceptibility patterns,
pointing to the very likely point of origin of this contamin-
ation event. Careful monitoring of all microbiological la-
boratory results in the next 2 weeks did not provide
evidence of cross-contamination to other patients.
Discussion
This article describes a protracted outbreak of postoper-
ative infections with ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex
in cardiac surgery patients, consisting of three episodes
and involving two different bacterial strains. Previously
published outbreaks of E. cloacae infections following
cardiac surgery have been linked to surgical complica-
tions and cephalosporin prophylaxis [7], liberal use of
cephalosporins [8], contamination of an intra-arterial
monitoring device [9], contaminated cardioplegia ice
[10] and increased use of cefepime and quinolones [11].
There is also one report of a TEE-associated increased
incidence of E. cloacae isolated from oropharyngeal and
sputum samples at a cardiovascular ward, without an ac-
companying increase in E. cloacae pneumonia [12]. We
Fig. 3 Timeline of cases and key interventions performed to control the outbreak. A more detailed list of all infection control measures taken is
shown in Additional file 1: Table S1. Abbreviations: CSICU cardiac surgery intensive care unit, MRGN multiresistant Gram-negative bacteria, TEE
transesophageal echocardiography
Van Maerken et al. Antimicrobial Resistance and Infection Control           (2019) 8:152 Page 8 of 14
Table 2 Comparison of preoperative, intraoperative and postoperative characteristics between cases of the first outbreak episode
and control patients
Categorical variables Case patients, n (%) Control patients, n (%) Odds ratio (95% CI) P value
Female sex 4 (50) 2 (13) 7.00 (0.92–53.23) .129
Smokera 3 (38) 2 (13) 4.20 (0.54–32.96) .289
Medical history
Congestive heart failure 4 (50) 5 (31) 2.20 (0.39–12.57) .412
Hypertension 7 (88) 7 (44) 9.00 (0.89–91.26) .079
Myocardial infarction 2 (25) 2 (13) 2.33 (0.26–20.66) .578
Peripheral vascular disease 1 (13) 2 (13) 1.00 (0.08–13.02) 1.000
Cerebrovascular disease 1 (13) 3 (19) 0.62 (0.05–7.12) 1.000
COPD 1 (13) 3 (19) 0.62 (0.05–7.12) 1.000
Diabetes 0 (0) 4 (25) 0.29 (0.03–2.91) .262
Chronic renal failure 2 (25) 4 (25) 1.00 (0.14–7.10) 1.000
Dialysis 1 (13) 0 (0) 4.25 (0.33–54.07) .333
Cirrhosis 1 (13) 1 (6) 2.14 (0.12–39.47) 1.000
Solid organ transplantation 0 (0) 1 (6) 0.89 (0.07–11.22) 1.000
Previous cardiac surgery 0 (0) 1 (6) 0.89 (0.07–11.22) 1.000
Preoperative ICUs or wardsb
CSICU 2 (25) 1 (6) 5.00 (0.38–66.01) .249
CICU 1 (13) 5 (31) 0.31 (0.03–3.29) .621
MICU 0 (0) 1 (6) 0.89 (0.07–11.22) 1.000
SICU 1 (13) 0 (0) 4.25 (0.33–54.07) .333
Cardiac surgery ward 3 (38) 10 (63) 0.36 (0.06–2.08) .390
Cardiology ward 2 (25) 3 (19) 1.44 (0.19–11.04) 1.000
Gastroenterology ward 1 (13) 0 (0) 4.25 (0.33–54.07) .333
General internal medicine ward 0 (0) 1 (6) 0.89 (0.07–11.22) 1.000
Geriatric ward 1 (13) 0 (0) 4.25 (0.33–54.07) .333
Nephrology ward 1 (13) 0 (0) 4.25 (0.33–54.07) .333
Preoperative medicationc
Antibioticsd 2 (25) 4 (25) 1.00 (0.14–7.10) 1.000
Proton pump inhibitors 5 (63) 4 (25) 5.00 (0.81–31.00) .099
Systemic corticosteroids 1 (13) 1 (6) 2.14 (0.12–39.47) 1.000
Preoperative ASA score of 5 4 (50) 0 (0) 17.00 (1.59–181.36) .007
Type of cardiac surgery
Aortic dissection repair 2 (25) 0 (0) 7.29 (0.64–82.62) .101
Atrial surgerye 1 (13) 4 (25) 0.43 (0.04–4.64) .631
CABGf 2 (25) 6 (38) 0.56 (0.08–3.69) .667
Heart transplantation 0 (0) 1 (6) 0.89 (0.07–11.22) 1.000
LVAD implantationf 2 (25) 0 (0) 7.29 (0.64–82.62) .101
Valve repair or replacementf 4 (50) 10 (63) 0.60 (0.11–3.34) .673
Emergency operation 4 (50) 0 (0) 17.00 (1.59–181.36) .007
Operating room
Operating room A 6 (75) 9 (56) 2.33 (0.36–15.30) .657
Operating room B 1 (13) 7 (44) 0.18 (0.02–1.86) .189
Operating room C 1 (13) 0 (0) 4.25 (0.33–54.07) .333
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Table 2 Comparison of preoperative, intraoperative and postoperative characteristics between cases of the first outbreak episode
and control patients (Continued)
Surgeons
Surgeon A 4 (50) 8 (50) 1.00 (0.18–5.46) 1.000
Surgeon B 4 (50) 6 (38) 1.67 (0.30–9.27) .673
Surgeon C 4 (50) 5 (31) 2.20 (0.39–12.57) .412
Surgeon D 2 (25) 8 (50) 0.33 (0.05–2.18) .388
Surgeon E 2 (25) 6 (38) 0.56 (0.08–3.69) .667
Surgeon F 2 (25) 0 (0) 7.29 (0.64–82.62) .101
Surgeon G 1 (13) 0 (0) 4.25 (0.33–54.07) .333
Surgeon H 1 (13) 0 (0) 4.25 (0.33–54.07) .333
Surgeon I 1 (13) 0 (0) 4.25 (0.33–54.07) .333
Surgeon J 0 (0) 4 (25) 0.29 (0.03–2.91) .262
Surgeon K 0 (0) 1 (6) 0.89 (0.07–11.22) 1.000
Anesthesiologists
Anesthesiologist A 5 (63) 7 (44) 2.14 (0.38–12.20) .667
Anesthesiologist B 3 (38) 6 (38) 1.00 (0.17–5.77) 1.000
Anesthesiologist C 2 (25) 6 (38) 0.56 (0.08–3.69) .667
Anesthesiologist D 2 (25) 3 (19) 1.44 (0.19–11.04) 1.000
Anesthesiologist E 2 (25) 1 (6) 5.00 (0.38–66.01) .249
Anesthesiologist F 1 (13) 0 (0) 4.25 (0.33–54.07) .333
Anesthesiologist G 1 (13) 0 (0) 4.25 (0.33–54.07) .333
Anesthesiologist H 0 (0) 3 (19) 0.39 (0.04–4.06) .526
Anesthesiologist I 0 (0) 1 (6) 0.89 (0.07–11.22) 1.000
Anesthesiologist J 0 (0) 1 (6) 0.89 (0.07–11.22) 1.000
Anesthesiologist K 0 (0) 1 (6) 0.89 (0.07–11.22) 1.000
Anesthesiologist L 0 (0) 1 (6) 0.89 (0.07–11.22) 1.000
Surgical antibiotic prophylaxis
Cefazoline 5 (63) 14 (88) 0.24 (0.03–1.87) .289
Vancomycin 1 (13)g 0 (0) 4.25 (0.33–54.07) .333
Amoxicillin–clavulanic acid 1 (13) 0 (0) 4.25 (0.33–54.07) .333
No additional coverageh 1 (13) 2 (13) 1.00 (0.08–13.02) 1.000
Sternotomy 7 (88) 12 (75) 2.33 (0.22–25.25) .631
ECC 8 (100) 16 (100) -i -i
Intraoperative TEE 8 (100) 16 (100) -i -i
Postoperative TEEj 7 (88) 5 (31) 15.40 (1.47–160.97) .027
Need for revisionk 5 (63)l 0 (0) 25.50 (2.36–275.74) .001
Beds occupied at CSICUm
Bed A 1 (13) 4 (25) 0.43 (0.04–4.64) .631
Bed B 1 (13) 3 (19) 0.62 (0.05–7.12) 1.000
Bed C 0 (0) 3 (19) 0.39 (0.04–4.06) .526
Bed D 1 (13) 3 (19) 0.62 (0.05–7.12) 1.000
Bed E 4 (50) 1 (6) 15.00 (1.29–174.39) .028
Bed F 2 (25) 0 (0) 7.29 (0.64–82.62) .101
Bed G 2 (25) 1 (6) 5.00 (0.38–66.01) .249
Bed H 1 (13) 1 (6) 2.14 (0.12–39.47) 1.000
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present multiple lines of evidence that point to TEE as
the source of the current outbreak, including the clinical
presentation of the cases (most typically with respiratory
samples positive for ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex
and development of pneumonia shortly after cardiac sur-
gery), the resolution of the first and third outbreak epi-
sode after removal of the damaged TEE probes and
institution of other TEE-directed infection control mea-
sures, the association of cases with longer surgery dur-
ation and traceable postoperative TEE examinations, the
occurrence of similar infections in SICU and MICU pa-
tients who had undergone TEE and the detection of an
identical molecular pattern between the isolates col-
lected from the cases in January 2018 and those from
two affected MICU patients, who appeared to have only
TEE as common exposure factor. We did not detect
ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex in any of the sam-
ples taken from the TEE probes, but a transient contam-
ination of the TEE probe of CSICU with four other
microorganisms was identified. The outbreak seemed to
be primarily confined to ESBL-producing E. cloacae
complex, as is illustrated in Additional file 1: Figure S1
and as is possibly in keeping with the absence of spreading
to other patients when the transient contamination event
with four other pathogenic bacteria occurred. The reasons
for this species and subtype specificity are unclear, but
may involve an increased susceptibility of cardiac surgery
patients to Enterobacter infections [13] and a higher viru-
lence of bacteria carrying antibiotic resistance–encoding
plasmids [14]. It is striking that the epidemic returned
with a different clone of ESBL-producing E. cloacae
complex in January 2018. Of note, a highly similar TEE-
associated outbreak of ESBL-producing E. cloacae com-
plex in cardiac surgery patients occurred in 2015 and
2016 in another university hospital in Belgium [15]. With
regard to the interval of 4 months between the first and
second outbreak episode, which were caused by the same
clone, possible explanations are reintroduction of the
strain by a patient or untreated carrier or the presence of
an environmental reservoir. Moist surfaces have been de-
scribed as sources of ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae
in the ICU, providing an opportunity for both outbreak
Table 2 Comparison of preoperative, intraoperative and postoperative characteristics between cases of the first outbreak episode
and control patients (Continued)
Bed I 1 (13) 2 (13) 1.00 (0.08–13.02) 1.000
Bed J 0 (0) 4 (25) 0.29 (0.03–2.91) .262
Deathn 2 (25) 1 (6) 5.00 (0.38–66.01) .249
Continuous variables Case patients, median (IQR) Control patients, median (IQR) P value
Age (yrs) 74 (54–80) 67 (55–77) .610
BMI (kg/m2) 26.5 (24.7–31.0) 26.2 (24.0–28.2) .492
Preoperative length of stay (days) 2 (0–5) 2 (1–8) .490
Duration of surgery (minutes) 275 (221–394) 197 (158–223) .011
Duration of ECC (minutes) 116 (99–356) 106 (79–145) .198
Length of stay at CSICU (days) 15 (6–31) 3 (1–5) .006
Postoperative length of stay (days) 30 (26–39) 10 (7–13) <.001
Total length of stay (days) 34 (26–63) 12 (8–25) .001
Abbreviations: ASA American Society of Anesthesiologists, BMI body mass index, CABG coronary artery bypass grafting, CI confidence interval, CICU cardiac
intensive care unit, COPD chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, CSICU cardiac surgery intensive care unit, ECC extracorporeal circulation, ESBL extended-spectrum
β-lactamase, ICU intensive care unit, IQR interquartile range, LVAD left ventricular assist device, MICU medical intensive care unit, SD standard deviation, SICU
surgical intensive care unit, TEE transesophageal echocardiography
aCurrent smoker. Findings were similar when smoking history was analyzed (data not shown)
bIntensive care units or wards where the patient was hospitalized prior to cardiac surgery
cRecent medication use (within seven days of cardiac surgery)
dPreoperative use of antibiotics for therapeutic purposes (infection). See below for perioperative antibiotic prophylaxis
eOne or more of the following procedures: left atrial appendage exclusion, maze procedure, patent foramen ovale closure. Atrial surgery was always performed in
conjunction with another cardiac surgical procedure
fAlone or in combination with another cardiac surgical procedure
gVancomycin was administered prophylactically to one patient who was already on treatment with piperacillin–tazobactam
hNo additional prophylactic use of antibiotics in patients already on antibiotic treatment
iMeasures of association were not computed for categorical variables that had a constant value in each of the cases and controls
jTraceable TEE examination in the postoperative period. This may be an underestimation of the actual number of patients who had postoperative TEE examinations due
to underregistration
kPostoperative need for urgent reoperation because of a major non-infectious complication
lFour patients required one or more revision operations for bleeding with imminent or manifest pericardial tamponade. Five of these revision operations occurred
prior to infection with ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex (see Table 1). A fifth patient was reoperated because of postoperative mitral regurgitation with
hemodynamic instability. This revision took place shortly after the onset of infection with ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex
mBeds where the patient stayed at CSICU
nFatal outcome (overall mortality)
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recurrence and continued sporadic isolation of the causa-
tive organism in the post-outbreak period [16].
A limitation of this investigation is that we were not able
to assign specific TEE probes to cases on a one-by-one
basis because of incomplete documentation and underre-
gistration of TEE examinations. Prompt implementation of
a system for full traceability was a major demand of the
management board of the hospital when the third outbreak
episode occurred. It should also be noted that not all cases
can simply be attributed to a TEE procedure. For instance,
case #12 did not have a traceable TEE examination, sug-
gesting the involvement of an alternative transmission
route. Cross-contamination via the hands of healthcare
workers is generally considered the main mode of
transmission of ESBL-producing bacteria [17] and may
perhaps account for a few cases of the reported outbreak.
We cannot be sure whether the TEE-mediated trans-
mission events of ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex
resulted from human errors in the manual reprocessing
and handling of TEE probes or from an intrinsic failure
of the cleaning and disinfection procedure. However, a
striking observation was the similar pattern of damage
of four different TEE probes. It seems highly plausible
that irregular surfaces and poorly accessible nooks and
crannies resulting from torn-off silicone parts and shred-
ded polyethylene film fragments cannot be adequately
disinfected anymore. An important question is what the
root cause of this damage is. We have been cleaning and
Fig. 4 Clonal relatedness of ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex isolates. a Profile of β-lactam resistance genes. Dashed lines separate the
outbreak isolates of 2017 (first and second outbreak episode), the outbreak isolates of 2018 (third outbreak episode, supplemented with two
isolates from non-cardiac surgery patients PC1 and PC2) and the negative control isolates (collected in 2017 from non-cardiac surgery patients
not involved in the outbreak, denoted as NC1, NC2 and NC3). Blue, presence of a gene sequence in the isolate genome with > 90% identity to a
β-lactam resistance gene in the ResFinder database; green, presence of a gene sequence in the isolate genome with 100% identity to a β-lactam
resistance gene in the ResFinder database; yellow, resistance gene not detected in the isolate genome. b Sequence type as assessed by MLST.
For each isolate genome, the best-matching allele at each locus of the MLST scheme was identified and sequence type was then determined by
the combined allelic profile. Numbers shown are unique identifiers of alleles and sequence types. Dashed lines separate the outbreak isolates of
2017, the outbreak isolates of 2018 and the negative control isolates. Abbreviations: ESBL extended-spectrum β-lactamase, MLST multilocus
sequence typing, ST sequence type
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disinfecting the TEE probes manually using chlorine di-
oxide–generating wipes for several years, according to
the manufacturer’s recommendations. The same manual
reprocessing method was in use in the other Belgian
university hospital that suffered from a TEE-associated
outbreak of ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex in cardiac
surgery patients [15]. Chlorine dioxide is a strong oxidizing
agent with broad-spectrum antimicrobial activity. Although
the corrosive activity of chlorine dioxide is relatively low
compared to other disinfectants [18], there are concerns
that it may damage metal and polymer components of en-
doscopes [19], especially after long-term use [20]. It re-
mains speculative whether the detachment of the silicone
bead around the transducer lens and the rupture of the
protective polyethylene film were caused by chlorine diox-
ide–induced corrosion. These defects could, e.g., also reflect
a manufacturing problem or material weakness of the TEE
probes, which was possibly aggravated by the repetitive
mechanical action of wiping. In any case, a common under-
lying problem is very likely given the occurrence of the
same type of damage with four individual devices. Much to
our surprise, the compatibility testing report that can be re-
quested from the manufacturer did not alleviate our con-
cerns on a potential damaging effect of chlorine dioxide–
generating wipes and could serve as an additional relevant
source of information to users of the same equipment. We
finally made the decision to implement an automated
reprocessing system for the TEE probes of the operating
rooms and CSICU, which uses peracetic acid 5% as high-
level disinfectant, and to impose the obligatory use of a
TEE cover sheath during cardiac surgery.
Conclusions
In conclusion, this report documents a TEE-associated
triphasic outbreak of postoperative infections with two
distinct strains of ESBL-producing E. cloacae complex in
cardiac surgery patients. Appropriate precautions must
be taken to prevent and detect damage of TEE probes.
The use of safe and effective reprocessing and handling
methods is critical in this regard and regular inspection
of TEE probe integrity is highly advisable.
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